cess enjoyed by the Conservatives, persuasive claims are made that Thatcherism did not fundamentally alter the nation's political values. Clearly, certain social democratic values retained strong support among the public even at the height of the Thatcherite boom (as evidenced in opinion research on such matters as collective provision, welfare, and social responsibility).
A MORI poll published by The Independent on the tenth anniversary of the 1979 election victory illustrated that a majority of the public did not share many of the core principles of Thatcherism.
2 An earlier MORI poll in June 1988, as Ivor Crewe suggests, demonstrated that given the choice between `a ``Thatcherite'' and a ``socialist'' society the public opted for the Thatcherite model on only 2 out of 5 dimensions, and then by small majorities . . . After nine years of Thatcherism the public remain wedded to the collectivist, welfare ethos of social democracy.' Crewe argues that, with the exception of privatisation, Conservative values failed to grow among the electorate between 1974 and 1987. 3 Whatever its success in the electoral and other fields, Thatcherism did not succeed in the long term in reforming popular opinion on key political issues. Such were its ambitions that it hoped to `build new coalitions of interest, to win the battle of ideas for a radical change of direction and the dismantling of old structures and old priorities'.
Of course, its achievements often did not match its ambitions. Although its ambitions extended beyond winning office, Thatcherism's ability to successfully office seek provided it with the opportunity to policy seek in government. While its electoral support was never so secure as to make it an hegemonic project, Thatcherism utilised its electoral base to pursue significant reforms in both the state and civil society. The lasting consequence of Thatcherism demonstrates that party competition theories which simply examine party±elector relations may not in themselves fully illuminate the contribution that party competition makes to the process of political change (as evidenced in party change). Party linkages provide a core focus for an evaluation of the political consequences of Thatcherism, as distinct from the impact that Thatcherism had on electoral attitudes. The consequential interaction of parties can be only indirectly influenced by electoral outcomes. Here, parties may follow electors or follow where competitor parties lead. While electors can influence parties (Downs) and parties influence electors (Dunleavy) they also influence one another (subject to the fact that the interaction of parties with electors facilitates the interaction of parties). Party competition involves a set of intra-party interactions at the same time as it involves a series of party±elector relationships. Because these two processes are interrelated and help determine political outcomes, party competition can be a crucible of political change both within and between parties. An assessment of the dynamic (and impact) of party competition therefore requires an inter-party focus.
In analysing the impact of Thatcherism, too much should not be made of its electoral reception. The work of Stuart Hall on `authoritarian populism' can misleadingly suggest that the ideological intentions of the Thatcher government were part and parcel of a strategy to wholly transform electoral opinions. 5 The objective of Thatcherism was to gain influence over the ship of state by establishing an electoral grasp on the levers of power. In this sense, contra Hall, a reliable electoral base rather than a political hegemony was fashioned in the first instance. Thatcher wanted to win hearts and minds but knew than the conversion of the mass to the ideals of Thatcherism was a hard task. Political considerations prompted the Thatcher government to devise strategies to secure election and re-election but a hegemonic project directed at the electorate was not the `be all and end all' of Thatcherite politics. In many ways the idea of a public hegemony envisaged by Hall was an illusion; what was sought was a reliable electoral base, and ministers were happy that an electoral poll of 40±44 per cent of those voting was not merely sufficient for their ends but could grant a landslide (or at
